This paper investigates whether leading indicators can help explain the cross-country incidence of the 2008-09 financial crisis. Rather than looking for indicators with specific relevance to the current crisis, the selection of variables is driven by an extensive review of more than eighty papers from the previous literature on early warning indicators. The review suggests that central bank reserves and past movements in the real exchange rate are the two leading indicators that have proven the most useful in explaining crisis incidence across different countries and crises in the past. For the 2008-09 crisis, we use six different variables to measure crisis incidence: drops in GDP and industrial production, currency depreciation, stock market performance, reserve losses, or participation in an IMF program. We find that the level of reserves in 2007 appears as a consistent and statistically significant leading indicator of the current crisis, in line with the conclusions of the earlier literature. In addition to reserves, recent real appreciation is a statistically significant predictors of devaluation and of a measure of exchange market pressure during the current crisis. That our data on the crisis period include the first quarter of 2009 may explain why we find stronger results than earlier papers such as Obstfeld, Shambaugh and Taylor
Introduction
This paper places itself in the long line of the early warning indicators literature by attempting to identify variables that may help explain crisis incidence in 2008-09. This literature has recently achieved renewed relevance. At the height of the crisis in November 2008, the G20 group of nations asked the IMF to conduct new early warning exercises, followed by a call for the fund "to provide early warning of macroeconomic and financial risks and the actions needed to address them" in the April 2009 London summit. 1 An assessment of whether any variables can explain 2008-09 crisis incidence is highly relevant to evaluating the usefulness of such future exercises.
Aside from generating increased policymaker interest, the 2008-09 crisis is particularly well suited to undertaking an assessment of the potential usefulness of leading indicators. First, the very large magnitude of the current crisis makes it a good candidate against which the predictive power of various variables can be tested. Second, the crisis has been uniquely broad and relatively synchronized across the global economy. As such, a global sample can be used, and issues related to the timing of crisis incidence and the modeling of staggered spillover effects can be largely finessed. 2 The next section of the paper conducts an extensive review of more than eighty papers from the early warning indicators literature. We ask whether any variables have consistently proven successful as leading indicators of crisis incidence in the past. This review drives the selection of variables for the empirical analysis of the 2008-09 crisis.
The third section of the paper conducts an empirical investigation into which countries proved most vulnerable during the 2008-09 crisis. We investigate whether any of the economic or financial variables were able to predict successfully the incidence of the financial crisis. The focus is on the variables identified in the literature review, rather than indicators specifically selected for the 2008-09 crisis. A country is considered more "vulnerable" if it experienced larger output drops, bigger stock market falls, greater currency weakness, larger losses in reserves, or the need for access to IMF funds. The fourth section of the paper evaluates the economic significance of the results and draws policy implications from our findings.
The Challenges of the Early Warning Indicators Literature
The early warning indicators literature is extensive. However, identifying broad lessons from this empirical work is fraught with difficulties. First, the definitions of a financial crisis and the severity of incidence vary widely. These differences will be explored in more detail below. Second, the literature investigates different types of crisis, in different countries and over different time periods. The results from most of these studies therefore lack generality, and the lessons learned from one crisis and country may not be relevant for another. Third, and perhaps most importantly, the empirical work on leading indicators faces a problem of selection bias. The variables examined as indicators are selected with the benefit of hindsight, albeit usually based on some underlying economic reasoning. Even if these are identified as statistically significant, their usefulness can be questionable if they have been identified after the crisis has occurred.
To overcome the limitations above, the approach taken here is to identify the causes and symptoms of financial crises, if any, that have been most consistent over time, country and crisis.
We conduct a broad review of the literature, and attempt to categorize systematically the empirical findings into a ranking of the indicators that have been found to be statistically significant. Rather than focusing on the specific causes of this crisis, we examine the success of the indicators identified in the earlier literature in predicting 2008-09 financial crisis incidence.
Definitions of "crisis" and "crisis incidence"
While the variety of independent variables used to explain crisis incidence has been extensive, the literature has converged on a narrower set of dependent variables used to measure the intensity and occurrence of crises. This notwithstanding, there is still wide variation in the way a crisis is defined, as highlighted by both Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (1996, henceforth KLR) and Abiad (2002) .
The literature uses both discrete and continuous measures to define a crisis. Discrete measures are usually in the form of binary variables, which define a crisis as occurring once a particular threshold value of some economic or financial variable has been breached. Frankel and Rose (1996) define a "currency crash" as a depreciation of the nominal exchange rate of more than 25% that is also at least a 10% increase in the rate of nominal depreciation from the previous year. Another measure, popularized by Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1995) , defines an "exchange market crisis" as occurring when their index of speculative pressure moves at least two standard deviations above its mean. Continuous measures of crisis incidence overcome the problem of defining particular thresholds by measuring crisis intensity on a continuous scale.
The literature has focused on a relatively narrow set of variables that are used in defining a crisis. The vast majority of studies include some measure of changes in the exchange rate.
These include bilateral nominal exchange rates predominantly against the US dollar (for instance Edwards 1989; Frankel and Rose 1996; Bruggemann and Linne 1999; Osband and Rijckeghem 2000) , real exchange rates (Goldfajn and Valdes 1998; Esquivel and Larrain 1998; Apoteker and Barthelemy 2000) , and changes in the SDR exchange rate Spiegel 2009a, 2009b) .
Exchange rate changes have often been combined with movements in reserves to create indices of exchange market pressure that measure crisis intensity regardless of exchange rate regime (Sachs, Tornell and Velasco 1996a,b; Corsetti, et al, 1998; Fratzcher, 1998; KLR 1998; The different modeling approaches employed in the leading indicators literature can be broadly grouped into four categories. (See Abiad 2002; Hawkins and Klaw 2000; Collins 2001 for similar categorizations.) The first and most popular category uses linear regression or limited dependent variable probit/logit techniques. These are used to test the statistical significance of various indicators in determining the incidence or probability of occurrence of a financial crisis across a cross-section of countries. Some of the first studies to use these techniques include Eichengreen, Rose and Wypslosz (1995) , Frankel and Rose (1996) and Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1996a, b) , but they have since been used widely.
The second category, known as the non-parametric, indicators, or signals approach was first popularized by KLR (1998) and further developed in studies such as Bruggemann and Linne (2000) and Edison (2003) . The approach consists of selecting a number of variables as leading indicators of a crisis, and determining threshold values beyond which a crisis signal is considered to be given. While the statistical significance of the indicators used cannot be determined directly because the thresholds are determined within-sample, statistical tests can be undertaken to investigate the out-of-sample performance of these indicators. Tests of the out-of-sample significance of the KLR and other signal-based models have been undertaken by, among others, Berg and Patillo (1999) , Bussiere and Mulder (1999) and Berg, Borenztein and Patillo (2004) , who have shown these models to be moderately successful in predicting financial crises.
The third category employs a qualitative and quantitative analysis of the behavior of various variables around crisis occurrence by splitting countries into a crisis and non-crisis control group. These techniques were predominantly used in the earlier leading indicators literature, with Kamin (1988) , Edwards (1989) , Edwards and Montiel (1989) , Edwards and Santaella (1993) using some of the largest samples. Unlike the more recent literature, these consist of panel studies where the emphasis is on trying to predict the date at which a crisis occurs, rather than on the cross-sectional incidence of crisis.
The fourth, and most recent, category encompasses the use of more innovative techniques to identify and explain crisis incidence, including the use of binary recursive trees to determine leading indicator crisis thresholds (Ghosh and Ghosh 2002; Frankel and Wei 2004) , artificial neural networks and genetic algorithms to select the most appropriate indicators (Nag and Mitra 1999; Apoteker and Barthelemy 2001) and Markov switching models (Cerra and Saxena 2001; Martinez Peria 2002) .
What We Know from the Literature
The wide range of estimation techniques notwithstanding, the literature has converged on a number of independent variables which are most frequently examined as leading indicators of crisis incidence. A useful starting point for an overview of previous work are the three extensive reviews conducted by KLR (1998) for studies up to 1997, Hawkins and Klau (2000) for studies up to Abiad (2002) for studies up to 2001. These three reviews survey more than eighty papers conducted over a period covering crisis episodes from the 1950s up to 2002. Abiad (2002) does not however provide a systematic ranking of which indicators were found to be statistically significant across the various studies investigated. Furthermore, neither Abiad (2002) nor Hawkins and Klau (2000) include all of each other's studies in their reviews. This section integrates the findings of all three reviews, and provides a more systematic analysis of the indicators in the studies cited by Abiad (2002) . We also evaluate the results of seven new papers published since 2002. Table 1 below summarizes the number of times a particular indicator was found to be statistically significant across the reviews and additional studies cited above. The indicator listing is based on Hawkins and Klau (2000) with some modifications, and the footnotes to the table indicate which variables have been included in each indicator category. Appendix 1 includes a detailed breakdown of the criteria used to identify significant variables in the papers cited by Abiad (2002) and the most recent literature.
Based on the results below, foreign exchange reserves, the real exchange rate, the growth rate of credit, GDP and the current account are the most frequent statistically significant indicators in the papers reviewed. Different measures of reserves and of the real exchange rate in particular stand out as the top two most important leading indicators, being statistically significant determinants of crisis incidence in more than half of the 83 papers reviewed.
Such a meta-analysis of the literature is plagued with the usual limitations of a comparative exercise. First, a common feature of all studies is that some indicators are included Hawkins and Klau (2000) , with exception of 1a includes imports, 1b debt composition rather than debt to international banks, 1c capital flows rather than capital account.
2 As reported in Hawkins and Klau (2000) , but M2/reserves added to reserves, interest rate differential added to real interest rate.
3 S&P, JP Morgan, IMF Indices, IMF WEO, IMF ICM, IMF EWS studies have been excluded due to lack of verifiability of results. The following adjustments have been made to the authors' checklist: significant credit variables reduced from 10 to 8 as Kaminsky (1999) considers level rather than growth rate of credit; significant capital account variables reduced from 1 to 0 as Honohan (1997) variable not in line with definition used here; Kaminsky (1999) significant variables for external debt reclassified to debt composition as these variables relate to short-term debt.
4 10 out of 30 studies excluded from analysis. 7 included in Hawkins and Klau (2000) and 3 due to absence of formal testing of variables.
5 Includes Berg, Borenzstein and Pattillo (2004) , Manasse and Roubini (2005) , Shimpalee and Breuer (2006) , Davis and Karim (2008 ), Bergmen et.al. (2009 ), Obstfeld, Shambaugh and Taylor (2009 , Rose and Speigel (2009a) .
6 See App. 1 for criteria defining statistical significance in Abiad (2003) and Others studies. For rest see KLR (1998), Hawkins & Klau (2001) Variables included in the leading indicator categories: The second limitation is that the criteria used to determine which indicators are significant in KLR (1998), Hawkins and Klau (2000) and in the last two columns by us are different. KLR (1998) include variables that have been found to be significant in at least one of the tests conducted in each paper, Hawkins and Klau (2000) use varying criteria, and we identify those variables that are statistically significant in the absolute majority of the different regressions or other estimation techniques used.
These limitations notwithstanding, it is encouraging that a broadly similar ranking of statistical significance is generated across all three reviews considered and the more recent literature. Both reserves and the real exchange rate are the two most significant indicators across all the review groupings considered, while credit, GDP and the current account rank highly in most of the columns of the table. In addition, an aggregation exercise of this type has the benefit of ensuring robustness of results. Consistency of statistical significance of an indicator across different periods and using different estimation techniques and crisis definitions makes for a more reliable indicator for policy making purposes. A second and broader empirical contribution to the literature are the papers by Rose and Spiegel (2009a; 2009b) find that countries with more leveraged domestic financial systems and more rapid credit growth tended to suffer larger downward revisions to their growth outlooks, while exchange-rate flexibility also helped reduce the impact of the shock. Interestingly, as in Rose and Spiegel (2009a) and Blanchard et al (2009) , the authors find little evidence that international reserves played a significant role in explaining crisis incidence. These results notwithstanding, their measure of crisis incidence has its limitations, focusing on revisions to growth forecasts by professional economists rather than actual growth outturns. Data on actual economic performance was not available at the time. The high frequency data are used to define crisis incidence from the second half of 2008 onwards, as analyzed in more detail below. All the independent variables are dated from 2007 or earlier, minimizing endogeneity issues.
Recent Research on the 2008-09 Crisis

Predicting the Incidence of the 2008-09 Financial Crisis
Defining the 2008-09 Crisis
An important element of an analysis of leading indicators is how crisis incidence is defined. We interpret crisis incidence broadly, defining it both in terms of financial and real incidence. The key difference from the earlier empirical work is that we consider the crisis to These two drawbacks notwithstanding, the inclusion of reserves as a measure of crisis incidence allows one to observe an increase in market pressure that may not otherwise be captured through exchange rate moves. This is particularly relevant for countries with fixed exchange rate regimes, where capital flight and crisis incidence are manifest through larger drops in reserves rather than exchange rate weakness.
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We augment our analysis in Section 3.6 with an exchange market pressure index that does include reserves and attempts to correct for both of the problems highlighted above.
Independent Variables
The independent variables selected are based on the indicators identified in the literature review. The explanatory variables all refer to the 2007 calendar year, unless noted otherwise, and are grouped into the following categories:
Reserves
Reserves appeared as the most frequent statistically significant variable in the literature. The measures included in this study are reserves as percentage of GDP, reserves as a percentage of total external debt, reserves in months of imports, the ratio of M2 to total reserves and short term debt as percentage of total reserves.
Real Effective Exchange Rate
The source of these data is the IMF's real effective exchange rate database. 
Credit
The variables included are the five and ten year rise in domestic credit as a percentage of GDP.
Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1996a,b) , who were among the first to popularize this measure, argue that it is a good proxy of banking system vulnerability, as rapid credit expansion is likely associated with a decline in lending standards. A credit depth of information index as well as the bank liquid reserves to bank assets ratio are also used, as alternative measures of banking system vulnerability.
Current Account
Variables under this category are the current account balance as a percentage of GDP in 2007, and the average balance in the five and ten years up to 2007. Net national savings as a percentage of GNI and gross national savings as a percentage of GDP are also included in this category.
Money Supply
The ten-and five-year growth rates of liquid liabilities (M3) and money and quasi-money (M2) are used. Alternative leading indicators relating to the money supply such as the money multiplier and excess M1 balances are not included due to a lack of data availability.
Exports and Imports
This includes exports, imports and the trade balance as a percentage of GDP.
Inflation
The two variables are the average CPI inflation rate over the last five and ten years.
Equity Returns
Equity market returns are measured as the five year percentage change in benchmark stock market indices expressed in local currencies, as well as the five year volatility-adjusted return.
The source of these data is Bloomberg.
Interest Rate
The real interest rate as well as deposit rates are included.
Debt Composition
The variables included in this category are the amount of short-term debt as a percentage of exports and as a percentage of total external debt, public and publicly guaranteed debt service as a percentage of exports and of GNI, multilateral debt service as a percentage of public and publicly guaranteed debt service, aid as a percentage of GNI and gross financing via international capital markets as a percentage of GDP. Earlier research has mostly focused on the effects of short-term debt, finding a positive relationship with crisis incidence (Frankel and Rose 1996; Kaminsky 1999 ; among others). The relationship between crisis incidence and public debt or aid/debt owed to multilaterals has been examined less frequently. Some studies suggest a positive and negative effect of crisis incidence and public and multilateral debt respectively (Frankel and Rose 1996; Milesi-Ferretti and Razin 2000) .
Legal/Business Variables
The variables under this category are the strength of legal rights index and business extent of disclosure index included in the World Development Indicators database.
Capital Flows
The variables measured are net foreign direct investment inflows, outflows and total FDI flows, as well as portfolio flows (debt and equity), all expressed as a percentage of GDP. The first two variables refer to net FDI by foreign companies into the domestic economy and by domestic companies to foreign markets respectively. Total FDI flows are calculated as the sum of inflows and outflows. A larger amount of total FDI flows into the economy, considered a more stable source of balance of payments financing, is expected to have a negative relationship with crisis incidence. Larger portfolio flows, considered more easily reversible, are expected to be associated with higher crisis incidence.
External Debt
External debt is represented by total debt service as a percentage of GNI, and by the net present value expressed as a percentage of exports and GNI.
Peg/Financial Openness
The Chinn-Ito (2007) 
Empirical Analysis
Dependent Variables
We start the empirical analysis with a quantitative description of the dependent variables used to define crisis incidence. Appendix 4 presents the top and bottom ten performing countries on each of the continuous variables used. Some of the usual suspects figure prominently. Many
Eastern European countries show up as suffering the most from the crisis. China stands out as a country that suffered less. Strikingly, it is the only country that appears in the list of bestperformers across all four variables. While some of the differences in country rankings across indicators reflect different data availability, 7 the differences can be mostly attributed to countryspecific economic factors.
The Baltic countries suffered some of the largest drops in industrial production and GDP, but the tenacity of their exchange rate pegs to the euro meant that their currencies did not depreciate versus the dollar in comparison with other emerging market currencies. Similarly, despite the large drops in Japan's GDP and industrial production, the Japanese yen was one of the top performing currencies during the crisis, largely due to the unwinding of the yen carry trade (as Rose and Spiegel 2009a also point out). The differences in the measurement of crisis incidence reinforces the need to use multiple definitions of crisis incidence against which the predictive power of various leading indicators can be tested.
Continuing the descriptive statistics, Appendix 5 presents correlation coefficients across the four continuous variables and the binary IMF variable. Unlike the rankings presented above, the results here offer a more consistent picture. All ten cross-correlations have the expected sign, and half are statistically significant at the 10% level or less. Unsurprisingly, the highest correlations are between the changes in GDP and industrial production. Stock market performance also appears to correlate well with changes in real output. On the other hand, the change in the exchange rate has the weakest correlation with the other variables, likely reflecting the presence of exchange rate pegs in the sample of countries examined.
Bivariate Regressions
We begin the statistical analysis by running bivariate regressions of the crisis incidence indicators on each independent variable. The bivariate tests are meant to be exploratory, though it would also be useful for practitioners to have simple rules of thumb phrased in terms of individual variables. For the exchange rate, equity market, industrial production and GDP Rose and Spiegel (2009a,b) and others. Past appreciation as measured by the real effective exchange rate also appears as a significant leading predictor of currency weakness during the 2008-09 crisis, and has a correct and consistent sign in all other regressions.
Turning to the next indicators on the list, the rise in credit variables, they have the anticipated signs across all measures, and at both the five and ten year horizon: higher credit growth is associated with higher crisis incidence. Only three out of the ten regressions considered are statistically significant however. The rise in credit is particularly associated with greater subsequent stock market weakness. An indicator focusing more narrowly on the liquidity of the banking system, measured as banks' liquid reserves to bank assets ratio, also has a consistent and negative sign across all specifications. Though the latter variable does not figure prominently in the earlier literature, the finding is in line with Berkmen et al (2009) , who conclude that countries with a more leveraged financial system and higher credit growth suffered more during the crisis.
Three other indicators from the analysis are worth mentioning. First, higher past GDP growth is associated with larger output drops during the current crisis, as well as a higher probability of recourse to the IMF. This appears somewhat counterintuitive, but may be attributable to a positive link between higher GDP growth rates and asset market bubbles and credit or commodity export booms. -0.000 (-0.9)
Third, both the level of external debt and the proportion of short term debt appear useful leading indicators. The coefficients on short-term debt measured in terms of reserves (classified here in the reserves category), as a percentage of exports or relative to external debt have consistent signs across all specifications, with the first two measures also appearing as statistically significant in at least two of the five crisis incidence measures. The level of external debt appears particularly useful in explaining output and equity market drops, but not for the alternative crisis incidence measures.
Though no other indicators appear as consistently useful leading indicators, it is worth
highlighting the estimation results of the peg and financial openness dummy variables. Countries In sum, the results above are in line with the findings of the literature review, suggesting that international reserves were one of the most useful leading indicators of crisis incidence in 2008-09. Real exchange rate overvaluation, the other of the most popular indicators, is also useful, for predicting currency market crashes, which is the crisis measure on which the majority of studies in the literature have focused. High past credit growth was associated with higher incidence, perhaps via asset bubbles. Finally, the current account/national savings and the level of external and short-term external debt were also found to help consistently predict crisis incidence.
It is worth noting that each crisis incidence indicator is likely to be driven by different independent variables, though a more complete analysis is beyond the scope of this paper. The aim here has rather been to show that a limited set of variables -identified in earlier literaturecan predict crisis incidence measured in five different ways.
Introducing an Exchange Market Pressure Index
The literature has often used exchange market pressure indices combining changes in exchange rates and international reserves to measure crisis incidence. As highlighted earlier, the inclusion of reserves in such an index may bias crisis severity downwards due to the presence of a large number of IMF programs during the current crisis. At the same time, valuation distortions due to the large exchange rate movements that occurred over the period are also likely to misstate the true pressure on different countries' reserve holdings depending on their composition. We attempt to correct for these biases in two ways. First, for those countries that received IMF funding during the August-March period, reserves are treated as if they dropped to zero by the end of the period. In the absence of an IMF program, it is presumed that these countries would have suffered from a complete depletion of reserves. The coefficients on reserves and the real effective exchange rate retain their significance for the majority of the multivariate specifications considered. The coefficient on reserves relative to GDP maintains its statistical significance across regressions 1-3 when replaced with reserves 9 The rationale for this categorization is as follows: those countries pegging to the US dollar or euro are likely to have the majority of their reserves denominated in these currencies. Therefore, it makes sense to measure exchange rate and reserve changes in terms of the foreign currency to which the local currency is pegged. The reserve composition and currency basket weights of most countries following composite anchors are not publicly disclosed. Currency and reserve changes are measured against the IMF Special Drawing Right (SDR) in this instance. SDR weights are constructed on the basis of global export and reserve holding patterns, and therefore provide a reasonable first attempt at proxying the composition of these countries' reserve holdings and currency basket weights. In the absence of a relative benchmark for the free-floating currencies, the US dollar is used, following the majority of the literature. measured in months of imports, but loses significance when reserves are measured in terms of short-term or external debt and M2.
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Of the additional variables added to the baseline regression 2, only net foreign direct investment appears statistically significant at the 10% significance level. The results of this augmented specification are reported in the last column of table 3. The coefficient on real exchange rate appreciation retains its significance, but reserves lose their significance. As in the earlier analysis, reserves and the real effective exchange rate stand out as two of the most important leading indicators of crisis incidence. 10 The number of data points falls significantly when reserves are measured in terms of short-term or external debt, perhaps explaining the loss in significance in these specifications. 
Robustness Analysis
This section examines alternative crisis incidence measures to assess the robustness of the earlier analysis. In addition to the exchange market pressure index analyzed above, we introduce We repeat the bivariate analysis of Section 3.5.3 by regressing the exchange market pressure index and the modified crisis incidence measures on all independent variables while controlling for GDP per capita. The results are reported in Appendix 7. Comparing the four modified crisis incidence variables to those used in the earlier analysis, international reserves again stand out as a useful leading indicator. All measures of reserves with the exception of reserves relative to M2 remain statistically significant in at least two of the four modified measures used, as in the main body of the analysis. Past real effective exchange rate appreciation is still a significant variable in explaining currency weakness, and is also now significant in determining the probability of recourse to an IMF Standby Arrangement. The coefficients on the current account/national savings, credit growth, GDP, and total and short-term external debt all exhibit similar patterns of statistical significance to the main analysis, indicating that the results are robust to the methodology used to calculate crisis incidence.
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Economic Significance and Policy Implications
The econometric analysis above confirmed that the top two indicators identified in the literature review, the level of international reserves and real exchange rate overvaluation were also useful leading indicators of the 2008-09 crisis. Reserves appear consistently useful across the majority of the crisis measures used, while past real exchange rate appreciation play a significant role in explaining currency weakness as well as the broader measure of exchange market pressure.
Turning to the economic interpretation of these results, the estimates from the multivariate specifications in Table 3 Second, this paper strikes a more positive note than other recent papers on the usefulness of leading indicators in predicting crisis incidence. In spite of the differences in financial crisis characteristics across time and geography, the literature review identified a number of indicators that have proven consistently useful in explaining crisis incidence. These findings were confirmed by the empirical investigation of the 2008-09 crisis. Nevertheless, the implication of these findings should be treated with caution. First, the variables identified as the most useful were not consistently significant across all crisis measured used. Second, the ideal early warning system would not only be able to explain the incidence of crisis, as this -and most other papershave attempted to do, but also predict incidence ahead of time. This requires the estimation of model parameters based on past crises episodes, so that early warning signals can be generated before the crisis is observed. Berg and Patillo (1999) and Berg, Borensztein and Patillo (2004) , have spearheaded such out-of-sample assessments, and a relevant inquiry into how well existing early warning systems would have done in predicting the current crisis is an area of promising research.
Conclusion
This paper conducted an extensive review of the early warning indicators literature, and found a number of variables to be consistently useful in predicting financial crisis incidence across time, country and crisis in earlier work. These indicators were subsequently included in an empirical analysis of the 2008-09 crisis. International reserves and real exchange rate overvaluation, the top two indicators identified in the review, stood out as useful leading indicators of the current crisis. Reserves were robust to a number of crisis incidence definitions as well as the inclusion of additional independent variables in multivariate specifications using an exchange market pressure index as a measure of crisis incidence. Past exchange rate overvaluation only proved useful for measures of crisis incidence that defined a crisis in terms of the currency.
A number of other variables appear as potentially useful leading indicators during the current crisis, though their robustness across different crisis incidence measures and specifications was not as compelling. Lower past credit growth, larger current accounts/saving rates, lower external and short-term debt were associated with lower crisis incidence.
There remains fertile ground for further research into the effectiveness of early warning systems in predicting the 2008-09 crisis and beyond. The findings also highlight the potential economic significance of reserve levels and exchange rate policy in affecting crisis vulnerability.
Appendix
Appendix 1
Criteria Used to Identify Variable as Significant in Table 1 Study
Criteria used/Variables Included
Studies in Abiad (2003)
Berg and Pattillo (1999b) Indicators that are statistically signficant in 2 out of the 3 probit models used
Bruggemann and Linne (2000) No statistical test on individual indicators, because composite indicator used, which includes real exchange rate overvaluation, export growth and reserves. These variables are included in table 1 Bussiere and Mulder (2000) Variables significant in at least 5 out of 8 models used, Davis and Karim (2008) Variables significant at 10% level or less in both regressions reported in Table 7, regression 6 Manasse and Roubini ( Though not figuring prominently in the earlier literature, variables relating to financial market development may be particularly relevant given the origins of the current crisis. This appendix examines the relationship between financial market development and crisis incidence.
We measure levels of financial sector development by domestic credit, M2 and M3 expressed as a percentage of GDP. Market capitalization as a percentage of GDP is also included as an indicator of domestic financial market size. A more developed financial system may increase its resilience to external shocks, therefore suggesting a negative relationship between these variables and crisis incidence. At the same time, countries with more developed financial markets may have been more exposed to the current crisis given that it originated among developed-world financial institutions. The effect of financial market development on 2008-09 crisis incidence at first sight therefore seems ambiguous.
The table below reports the results of regressing measures of financial market development on our five crisis incidence variables. The results show a strong negative relationship between measures of financial market development and crisis incidence, suggesting that countries with larger or more developed financial markets suffered less from the crisis. All three level of credit variables appear to be statistically significant leading indicators of crisis incidence measured either in terms of GDP drops or recourse to the IMF. The level of broad money measured in terms of M2 or M3 also appears as a highly statistically significant predictor of crisis incidence measured either in terms of GDP drops or recourse to the IMF, as well as exchange rate drops. The measure of equity market capitalization provides similar results. 
